

THE STATE OF LATINO PUBLIC OPINION IN FLORIDA AND THE US· AUGUST 12, 2026

Dealignment, electoral evidence, and the Florida exception

Three claims, in ascending order of confidence

1

The polls show a snapback

Trump's Latino approval fell from approximately 44% (Mar 2025) to the low 30s across every 2026 survey; one quarter of his 2024 Latino voters say they would not repeat the vote. But polls are attitudes, not ballots.

2

The ballots partly confirm it

New Jersey and Virginia 2025 (the only real elections so far) saw Democrats win Latinos approximately 2-to-1 and flip 18% of Latino Trump voters (NJ). A Feb 2026 Texas special ran almost 79% Latino-Democratic.

3

But it is dealignment, not realignment

Democratic preference among Latinos (48–54%) runs well below the party's 2018 (69%) and 2022 (60%) benchmarks; about 38% say neither party cares about people like them. Florida, anchored by Cuban Americans, resists the trend entirely.

Dealignment vs. realignment: testable implications

Realignment predicts

A durable transfer of loyalty: defectors from one coalition adopt the other party's identity, favorability, and down-ballot habit. Democratic favorability should rise as Trump's falls.

Dealignment predicts

Exit without entry: defectors park as undecided or independent; both parties' favorability stays underwater; volatility rises election to election. Mike Madrid's reading of 2024–26.

What the data show

Trump's Latino approval collapsed, yet about 55% say Democrats care about people like them vs. 29% for the GOP and 38% say neither. Democratic congressional preference (48–54%) sits 6–21 points below 2018/2022 benchmarks.

Fifteen polls, three tiers of evidentiary weight



Tier 1 · Dedicated large-N Latino surveys

UnidosUS/BSP-Shaw (N=3,000, bipartisan team) · Equis/Data for Progress (N=1,614–2,000) · FIU LPOF (N=1,054+) · LIBRE/Public Opinion Strategies (N=1,200). Latino-designed instruments, Spanish-language interviewing, subgroup power.



Tier 2 · General-population polls, Latino crosstabs

CBS/YouGov (N=2,193) · Reuters/Ipsos (N=4,505, probability panel) · Economist/YouGov · Fox News. Rigorous topline, but Latino cells of ~250–450 carry ± 5 –7 error and volatile week-to-week reads.




Tier 3 · State & community polls

UNF PORL (FL, N=848 LV) · Emerson (FL, N=1,125 LV) · JMI/Targoz (FL, N=1,400 RV, no Hispanic crosstab) · Change Research · B&A/Tarrance (S. FL Cubans, N=800) · FIU Venezuelan module (N=408, non-probability).

Sponsor alignment, disclosed throughout: UnidosUS, Equis, Somos Votantes, Change Research lean progressive; LIBRE (Koch network) and JMI lean conservative; universities and wire-media polls are independent. Convergence across opposed sponsors is treated as the strongest signal.

From 44% to the low thirties in fifteen months

Trump approval among Latino voters (%)



-38

Net approval among Latinos, Fox News June 2026 (31/69) — from -11 in March 2025.

34% / 62%


Overall (all-adult) approval, Economist/YouGov Jul 25–27, 2026 — a record low for either Trump term; net -28.

-31

Equis net approval among Latinos in May 2026, down from -25 in March — the first significant drop since summer 2025.

One in four 2024 Trump Latino voters is gone — for now

Latino Trump 2024 voters who would not vote for him again (% , UnidosUS waves)



14% → 21%

Equis “potential defection” (would vote Democratic or undecided), Oct 2024 → May 2026 — independent corroboration.

5%


Of Harris's 2024 Latino voters say they would not repeat their vote. The erosion is asymmetric. (UnidosUS)

1/4 not guaranteed

Equis/Data for Progress (Jul 7–17, 2026): a quarter of 2024 Latino Trump voters are not guaranteed Republican votes in 2026.

Democratic preference runs far below its own benchmarks

Democratic share of the Latino House vote / preference (%)



48-34-10

CBS/YouGov (Jul 22-24): Democratic vs. Republican control preference among Latinos, with 10% "doesn't matter."

54-27 · D+21

UnidosUS generic ballot (May) and Equis national margin (May) — leads, but with about 19% undecided and both parties below 2024 levels.

38%

Say neither party cares about people like them. The dealignment indicator is flat across waves. (UnidosUS)

The freshest reads all point the same direction



48–34

CBS News/YouGov (Jul 22–24, N=2,193, ± 2.7): Latinos prefer Democratic control of Congress — well under the party's 2018/2022 margins. Majorities say GOP cost-of-living policies “hurt”; only ~a third say Democratic policies help.



D+8

Reuters/Ipsos (Jul 29–Aug 3, N=4,505, probability panel): Democrats lead by 8 as the more trusted party on cost of living — the national mood backdrop for the Latino affordability story.



34/62

Economist/YouGov (Jul 25–27): record-low overall approval for either Trump term; a further wave fielded Jul 31–Aug 3. Weekly Latino subsamples are volatile — cited for direction only.



5M

UnidosUS conference (Austin, Jul 29–30): no new topline — the news was a four-organization coalition (UnidosUS, LULAC Institute, Mi Familia en Acción, Latino Victory Fdn.) targeting 5M voters, 250K registrations, +5% turnout by 2028. LIBRE Action is running parallel GOP-side campaigns incl. Florida.

What the Koch-network poll actually says

Dating correction: the LIBRE Institute poll promoted in early-August conservative media as new evidence of a rightward shift was fielded April 17–23, 2026 (Public Opinion Strategies, N=1,200 Hispanic RV). No August field exists as of Aug 7.

53%

Believe the American Dream is achievable for people like themselves. The poll's real headline is pessimism, not partisanship.

80%+

Rate the economy fair or poor; 60% expect it to worsen; 70% call housing unaffordable; 83% say health-care costs rose.

83%


Support focusing deportations on serious criminals; 91% say the legal immigration system needs fixing — targeted, not mass, enforcement.

Convergence

A conservative-aligned pollster finds the same economic anxiety as UnidosUS and Equis. Cross-sponsor agreement is the strongest evidence in this literature.

The only real elections so far all point one way

Democratic share of the Latino vote, 2025–26 contests (%)



18%

Of Latino Trump 2024 voters flipped to Sherrill in NJ; she carried Latino men and women and all 10 counties that are $\geq 20\%$ Latino, flipping Passaic (Trump +3 in '24 $\rightarrow$ Sherrill +15).

Approximately 22 pts


leftward swing in Manassas Park, VA ($\approx 40\text{--}46\%$ Hispanic); Spanberger won Latinos roughly 2-to-1. CBS exits: 65% of VA and 57% of NJ Latinos disapprove of Trump.

Record

Latino turnout in the March 2026 Texas Democratic primary. Behavior, not just attitudes, is moving.

Affordability isn't an issue; it's the issue

Top issues, Latino voters (% ranking in top 3, UnidosUS)



Every sponsor finds it

UnidosUS: 60% top-3. LIBRE (Koch): 80%+ rate the economy fair/poor. At the UnidosUS conference, the live word cloud of attendee concerns was dominated by cost of living.



Immigration: intensity, not rank

Fifth as a priority — but 71% call deportations excessive (Pew), 83% prefer targeting serious criminals (LIBRE), and deportation fear reaches 52% of Latino adults (Pew).



The sleeper: health costs

Third-ranked and rising; 83% say their health-care costs increased (LIBRE); Medicaid/SNAP cuts from the Jul 2025 budget law remain broadly unpopular (65–68% opposed, UnidosUS).

Florida still bucks the national trend

–10

Net Trump approval among Florida Latinos — the least anti-Trump large state (vs. –46 to –55 in CA/TX/AZ). (FIU LPOF)

53%

Of Florida Cubans approve of Trump — the highest of any origin group nationally; 70%+ back the deportation campaign overall. (FIU)

51/41

Florida Hispanic disapproval/approval of Trump (UnidosUS) — vs. 67% disapproval nationally. Milder, but still net-negative.


20%

of Florida Hispanics who voted Trump in 2024 would not repeat the vote — below the 25% national defection, but no longer trivial. (UnidosUS)

Why: composition, not immunity. The statewide “Hispanic” number is a weighted average of a Republican-anchored Cuban bloc and Democratic-leaning Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Venezuelan blocs. Florida looks exceptional because its mix is exceptional — which is why the next two slides matter.

Governor 2026: settled primaries, contested general

Donalds (R) vs. Jolly (D), recent statewide polls (%)



+31

Donalds' GOP primary lead (JMI: 49–18 over Collins); Jolly leads the Democratic side with a majority still undecided. Primaries: Aug 18.

87%


of Trump 2024 voters back Donalds despite the endorsement (UNF) — 6% pick “someone else”; intra-GOP softness to watch after the primary.

Regions

UNF: Donalds +21 in North FL, +3 in Central FL; Jolly +2 in South FL. Independents essentially tied (39–38 Donalds). NPA voters in JMI: Jolly +17.

Same electorate, three answers: the Hispanic crosstab

Florida Hispanic vote in the governor's race, by pollster (%)



Subsample size

Statewide N of 848–1,125 yields Hispanic cells of ~150–250 → subgroup MOE of $\pm 7-9$. A 12-pt “swing” can be noise.

Population & screen

Likely-voter screens and the share of high-propensity Cuban Republicans move the average; UnidosUS's dedicated FL sample (N=500 RV) weights origin groups differently.

Mode & language

Phone vs. online and the availability of Spanish-language interviewing materially change the Cuban/non-Cuban mix reached.

Timing & house effects

Emerson's read is from March; UNF fielded in July after months of deportation coverage. Sponsor alignment adds house-effect variance.

Cubans and Venezuelans: loyalty under strain

Cuban South Florida (B&A/Tarrance, Apr 2026, N=800)

Venezuelan Florida (FIU, Apr 2026, N=408, non-probability)

68%

Disapprove of deporting Cuban nationals without criminal records (28% approve).

~1/2

of Venezuelan Trump voters regret or have mixed feelings about their 2024 vote; ~40% plan to back a Democratic, independent, or non-MAGA candidate in 2026.

81%

Say Cubans should be allowed to immigrate legally; 76% want benefit processing resumed.

57%

are personally affected by the TPS termination — the policy grievance cutting hardest against the administration in this community.

69–78%

Oppose any deal that leaves the Cuban government in power; broad support for U.S. pressure on Havana.

Gap

No quantitative poll of Venezuelan opinion AFTER the Jan 3 Maduro capture exists — reaction (Doral celebrations amid deportation anxiety) is documented only qualitatively. An open research opportunity.

Dealignment, not realignment

Every indicator since mid-July deepens the pattern: Trump's Latino numbers at record lows, real-ballot losses in NJ/VA, Democratic preference far under its own benchmarks, and ~38% saying neither party cares. The bloc has left one coalition without joining the other.

Falsifiable benchmarks

Toward realignment

Democratic favorability moves clearly net-positive and the Latino generic ballot re-approaches 60%+; defection converts into Democratic identification, not just “undecided.”

Toward reversion

UnidosUS/Equis defection plateaus or falls below ~20%; Trump economy net recovers toward parity; the 2026 Latino vote lands near 2024 levels.

Florida joins the trend

A post-primary poll shows Cuban Trump approval below ~45%, or the FL Hispanic crosstab breaks >10 pts toward Jolly among likely voters across multiple polls.

The polls

UnidosUS / BSP Research + Shaw & Co.

Apr 27–May 14, 2026 · N=3,000 Latino RV (FL 500) · multi-mode · ± 1.8 · bipartisan team

Equis / Data for Progress

Jul 7–17, 2026 · N=1,614 Latino RV · online · ± 2.4 · progressive-aligned

Equis Research

May 11–25, 2026 · N=2,000 Latino RV · ± 2 · progressive-aligned

LIBRE Institute / Public Opinion Strategies

Apr 17–23, 2026 · N=1,200 Hispanic RV · conservative (Koch network)

FIU Latino Public Opinion Forum

Annual LATINO Survey, unveiled Apr 2026 · N=1,000+ · university/independent

CBS News / YouGov

Jul 22–24, 2026 · N=2,193 adults · online panel · ± 2.7 · media/independent

Reuters / Ipsos

Jul 29–Aug 3, 2026 · N=4,505 adults · probability KnowledgePanel · $\sim \pm 1.7$

Economist / YouGov

Jul 25–27 & Jul 31–Aug 3, 2026 · $\sim$ N=1,600 adults · online panel

UNF PORL (Florida)

Jul 8–17, 2026 · N=848 FL LV · phone/text · ± 3.8 · university

JMI / Targoz (Florida)

Jul 20–26, 2026 · N=1,400 FL RV · ± 2.62 · conservative sponsor · no Hispanic crosstab

Emerson College (Florida)

Mar 29–31, 2026 · N=1,125 FL LV · ± 2.8 · university

B&A + Tarrance (Miami Herald) · FIU Venezuelan

Apr 6–10, 2026 · N=800 S. FL Cubans · phone · ± 3.5 | Apr 2026 · N=408 · non-probability

THANK YOU-GRACIAS